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The need for the South African (SA) National Research and Education Network (NREN) to 
establish a Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) was identified. CSIRTs offer a 
subset of all possible security services based on the environment and needs of the customers. 
Selecting this subset has its challenges as the view of the customer may differ from the provider 
and knowing which services will have the most impact (or be most beneficial) is difficult. In 
order to address the problem, this paper aims to propose an informed selection and prioritization 
of initial services for the SA NREN CSIRT, an academic sector CSIRT in South Africa. In order 
to do this, the first two stages of the IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL) service portfolio 
management process are used: defining the services based on authoritative CSIRT literature and 
analyzing them for value proposition and prioritization. A survey was used to obtain the 
viewpoint of the prospective customer base. The services are then selected based on the 
revelation of the SA NREN CSIRT as a coordinating CSIRT as well as the survey results. The 
primary contribution is providing a list of services for the CSIRT in the context of the SA NREN 
environment that can be used to develop a services portfolio. This study is useful to anyone 




CSIRT, CERT, security operations center, information security, incident response, services, ITIL 
service portfolio management. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
The concept of a Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) is well known in the 
information security domain as: “an organization or team that provides services and support to a 
defined constituency for preventing, handling, and responding to computer security incidents” 
(Alberts, Dorofee, Killcrece, Ruefle & Zajicek, 2004, p. 2). These incidents include all kinds of 
malicious activity on a network and PC level, ranging from Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and 
hacking attempts to malware and compromised systems. A CSIRT attempts to isolate, mitigate 
the effects of, disable and assist with recovery from these incidents (Killcrece, Kossakowski, 
Ruefle & Zajicek, 2003a). Secondary responsibilities may include incident prevention, advisory 
dissemination and security consultancy services in order to minimize risk and reduce actual 
incidents. The exact services provided depend on the needs of the constituency (customer base) 
and the available resources (finances and staff) (ENISA, 2006). It is useful to observe that 
similar services can be provided by Security Operations Centers (SOCs) (Zimmerman, 2014). 
 
CSIRTs have recently received renewed interest for novel areas of application like cloud 
computing (with its unique information security challenges) (Ab Rahman & Choo, 2015) and in 
developing countries  (Ellefsen & von Solms, 2012; Wara & Singh, 2015) catching up with the 
Internet bandwagon.  
 
A National Research and Education Network (NREN) provides backbone network infrastructure, 
access connectivity and specialized services to the academic and research institutions of a 
country. This includes high-bandwidth links for science and research, commodity Internet 
connectivity, network support and maintenance, and related services. An NREN can be seen as a 
specialized Internet Service Provider (ISP) for the research and education community of a 
country or region (GÉANT Association, 2010, para. 8). The South African National Research 
Network (SANReN) competency area together with the Tertiary Education and Research 
Network of South Africa (TENET) constitute the South African (SA) NREN. The SANReN 
project team design and build the network while the TENET team operate it. Both parties are 
involved in the development and provisioning of value-added services on top of the network 
(Petruccione et al., 2013). As of 28 February 2015, 204 higher education and research sites were 
connected to SANReN providing multi-gigabit Internet access with individual site bandwidth 
averaging at 2.82 Gbps (Staphorst, 2015). The number of connected sites continues to grow, 
covering nearly one million users at public universities, science councils and national research 
facilities throughout South Africa. 
 
From an ITIL perspective, SANReN and TENET are regarded as external service providers to 
the beneficiaries and customers of the NREN (Cannon, 2011, p. 83). As part of its mandate to 
develop new services for NREN beneficiaries, the SANReN competency area has been 
investigating the establishment of a CSIRT for the SA NREN. The remainder of this paper 
reports on how the SANReN team has proceeded to define the specific CSIRT services that 
should be offered, commencing with a delineation of the research. Thereafter the survey 
approach and results are presented followed by the selection of services in Section 7. 
 
2. Delineating the Research 
Successfully providing CSIRT services requires an holistic approach. This section focuses on 
how the services themselves can be selected by presenting the research problem, objectives and 
approach used in this paper.  
 
2.1 Research Problem and Objective 
The size of the SANReN makes it particularly vulnerable to malicious activity; including attacks 
on the data and infrastructure. In addition, intellectual property at connected universities and 
science councils is a valuable target for malicious actors. The threat of malicious activity 
including data theft, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and virus outbreaks is very real and 
handling incidents on this scale will require a collaborative effort.  
 
As a means of addressing this problem, it is proposed that an academic sector CSIRT (Killcrece 
et al., 2003a) be established to protect the NREN infrastructure and provide information security-
related services to the NREN customers and beneficiaries. One of the considerations is which 
CSIRT services to provide. The objective of this paper is therefore to expound on the literature 
study and survey process followed in order to determine which SA NREN CSIRT services 
should be provided. 
 
The approach used to achieve this objective is influenced by the manner in which people from 
industry select services. Considering that a CSIRT can be seen as a team providing specialized 
IT services to defined customers (the constituency) (West-Brown et al., 2003), the IT 
Infrastructure Library (ITIL®), as a framework for IT service management, is certainly 
applicable.  Thus, an ITIL-based approach was selected to provide structure to the study. 
 
2.2 ITIL Service Portfolio Management Approach  
According to ITIL, it is critical for a service provider to ensure that they deliver value to the 
consumer of the service (Cannon, 2011, p. 38). Furthermore, the value of a service lies in the 
perception of the customer and not the provider (Cannon, 2011, p. 55). Although a CSIRT as a 
whole can be seen as a service provided to a constituency, there are also a range of sub-services 
that can be provided. These services are external, customer-facing services (Cannon, 2011, p. 
52). In order to facilitate the decision of which sub-services should be provided by the SA NREN 
CSIRT, a survey was constructed and distributed to the future CSIRT constituency. The 
questions have an emphasis on determining the current situation and service requirements of the 
CSIRT’s potential customers thus enabling one to gauge the respondent’s requirements (Cannon, 
2011, p. 88) and perception of the value of each service (Cannon, 2011, pp. 56–57). 
 
The ITIL service portfolio management process is used to define the CSIRT activities in terms of 
services. There are four phases in this process: define, analyze, approve and charter (Cannon, 
2011, p. 180). In this paper the first two phases are executed in part. Firstly, generic CSIRT 
services are defined according to authoritative CSIRT literature in Section 4. Secondly, the value 
proposition and prioritization of services for the SA NREN CSIRT is achieved in Section 7 




Previous studies identified core CSIRT literature from ScienceDirect, Scopus, SpringerLink, 
IEEEXplore and Google Scholar based on a pattern of authoritative sources from respected 
authors (Mooi & Botha, in press). The primary sources were then selected as the most relevant 
publications from the associated institutions. A subset of this literature provides information on 
CSIRT services, as revealed in Table 1, following the form of a concept matrix (Webster & 




Smith  (1994) X AusCERTi  This article briefly mentions CSIRT services. 




An early list and description of services is provided in 
this best practice RFC – including real-time (reactive) 
and non-real-time (proactive) services – incident 
response (triage, coordination and resolution) and 
proactive activities (provisioning of information, 
security tools, education and training, product 
evaluation, site security auditing and consulting). 
West-Brown et al. (2003) XXX CMU-
SEIiii 
This handbook provides an updated list of all CSIRT 
services and categories as well as detailed descriptions 
of each service. (The original list was presented in the 
first edition of the handbook.) 
Killcrece et al. (2003a) XXX CMU-SEI Focusing on CSIRT organizational models, this report 
contains the same list and descriptions as West-Brown 
et al. (2003). A mapping of services to organizational 
models plus a summary of all models with core and 
extended services is also provided. 
Killcrece et al. (2003b) X CMU-SEI A state of the practice CSIRT survey. This report lists 
the services with brief descriptions of the each service 
category. It further reports on the services provided by 
survey participant institution. 
Alberts et al. (2004) X CMU-SEI This report on CSIRT processes provides an essential 
list of CSIRT services as well as the description of a 
coordinating CSIRT. 
ENISA (2006) XX ENISAiv This guide (in its Appendix 2) repeats the list and 
descriptions from West-Brown et al. (2003). 
ENISA (2010) X ENISA A minimal listing of services from CERT-CCv plus a 
list of extended services including forensics and 
vulnerability handling is made available in this guide. 
It refers to ENISA (2006) for services detail. 
Cichonski, Millar, Grance, 
& Scarfone   
(2012) 
XX NISTvi This report of recommendations lists the incident 
response process and examples of other services (with 
a short description) such as intrusion detection, 
advisory distribution, education and awareness, and 
information sharing. 
i Australian Computer Emergency Response Team 
ii University of Auckland (AUCK) with Sun Microsystems (SUN)  
iii Software Engineering Institute of Carnegie Mellon University  
iv European Union Agency for Network and Information Security  
v The CERT coordination center 
vi National Institute of Standards and Technology  
 
Table 1: Literature concept matrix for CSIRT services
 
From the concept matrix, the two primary sources for CSIRT services were identified based on 
the quantity of services-related material: the Handbook for Computer Security Incident Response 
Teams (CSIRTs) (West-Brown et al., 2003) and Organizational models for Computer Security 
Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) (Killcrece et al., 2003a) both from the Carnegie Mellon 
Software Engineering Institute (CMU-SEI). The Handbook for Computer Security Incident 
Response Teams provides guidance on building and running a CSIRT with a particular focus on 
the incident handling service (West-Brown et al., 2003, p. xv). In addition, a basic CSIRT 
framework is provided covering the mission, constituency, organizational placing and 
relationships of the CSIRT to other teams. Detailed descriptions of CSIRT services, policies and 
team operations (including staffing issues) are supplied. Organizational models for Computer 
Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) (Killcrece et al., 2003a) provides guidance on 
selecting the correct model for an organization’s incident response capabilities. The primary 
focus is on the organizational model and operational structure of the team. Common CSIRT 
models with their attributes, respective advantages and disadvantages and typical service 
offerings are discussed. The other sources provide inputs as indicated in the table. A study of 
 
 
these sources revealed a common list of services and descriptions that developed over time. This 
“standard” list and descriptions, also available on the web1, are utilized in this paper with the 
objective of establishing a baseline of CSIRT services. 
 
Surveys are an excellent method for obtaining facts and opinions (Hofstee, 2006, p. 122). 
Therefore a survey was selected as the research method towards achieving the objective of 
determining which services the SA NREN CSIRT should provide. In 2012 an exploratory survey 
was distributed to SANReN beneficiary institutions. This survey revealed a definite interest in 
CSIRT services but also some deficiencies in understanding within the community. It was 
therefore decided to perform a more in-depth literature study, host a workshop where the service 
details could be explained to and discussed with the constituency and then ask the attendees to 
complete a redesigned survey. This second survey was developed based on the information 
obtained through the literature study, compiled in Word and physically distributed and 
completed at a workshop as explained next. 
 
In May 2015, SANReN and TENET hosted a workshop with NREN beneficiary institutions to 
explore the establishment of an SA NREN CSIRT2. One of the workshop objectives was to 
explain the possible services that could be provided and to determine which services should have 
priority from the perspective of the participants. Attendees were educated on the possible 
services through presentations and discussions. A questionnaire was then handed out to the 
attendees for completion with the request that each institution respond only once. The completed 
surveys (feedback) were physically collected and the results were captured in Excel for analysis 
and graphing. The next section provides background on CSIRT services prior to describing the 
SA NREN environment (Section 5) and presenting the results of the survey (Section 6). 
Thereafter, the selection of services for the SA NREN CSIRT based on the survey results and 
literature is described in Section 7.  
 
4. CSIRT Services 
According to ITIL, “A service is a means of delivering value to customers by facilitating 
outcomes customers want to achieve without the ownership of specific costs and risks” (Cannon, 
2011, p. 47). CSIRT services assist customers in conducting their business by facilitating a more 
secure IT environment. They are classified in three broad categories, namely reactive, proactive 
or security quality management services (Killcrece et al., 2003a). 
 
As the primary CSIRT activity, reactive services involve actions taken to resolve or mitigate 
incidents as they occur (Alberts et al., 2004). They are triggered by events or requests requiring a 
“reaction” and thereby initiating the service process (Killcrece et al., 2003a, p. 13). Proactive 
services are aimed at preventing incidents from occurring in the first place by providing related 
announcements and information for preparing, protecting and securing systems (Killcrece et al., 
2003a, p. 14), training and education, monitoring and sharing information (Alberts et al., 2004). 
Security quality management services have a broader focus and may be provided by the CSIRT 






or another entity in an organization depending on the specific structure (Killcrece et al., 2003a, p. 




Alerts and warnings 
Incident handling – analysis, support, coordination 






Security audits or assessments 
Configuration and maintenance of security tools, 
applications and infrastructure 
Development of security tools 
Intrusion detection services 




Business continuity and disaster recovery planning 
Security consulting 
Awareness building 
Education and training 
Product evaluation or certification 
 
Table 2: CSIRT Services 
Source: West-Brown et al. (2003) 
 
 
Detailed descriptions of these services are beyond the scope of this paper but can be found in 
West-Brown et al. (2003) and Killcrece et al. (2003a).  Most CSIRTs do not provide all of these 
services but rather a subset based on the type of CSIRT and the needs of the constituency 
(Killcrece et al., 2003a, p. 14). A CSIRT should therefore select a core service offering and grow 
that as the need arises and resources allow (Killcrece et al., 2003a, p. 24). 
 
5. SA NREN Environment 
In order to optimize the survey for the SA NREN CSIRT and determine the services 
requirements, we needed to understand the SA NREN environment. Following the guidance 
presented in Mooi & Botha (2015), the SA NREN CSIRT environment is defined as an academic 
sector CSIRT serving the whole country of the Republic of South Africa. An embedded 
organizational model – with SANReN, TENET or a combination of both as the hosting 
organization – is preferred. These decisions are reflected in Table 3. 
 
Type of CSIRT Academic (research and education) 
Geographic area National – Republic of South Africa 
Organizational model Embedded – SANReN / TENET / Both 
 





This environment further reveals the constituency as the research and education institutions of 
South Africa: universities, science councils and supporting organizations; an external 
constituency. Based on these deductions, the SA NREN CSIRT is classified as a coordinating 
CSIRT: the customers are from external organizations and the CSIRT focus would be on 
coordination (Killcrece et al., 2003a, p. 130). 
 
In order to determine the required CSIRT services is it useful to determine the current state of 
affairs with respect to incident response in that environment. As described in Section 3, a survey 
was selected as the instrument to perform a needs analysis and identify beneficial CSIRT 
services from the perspective of the SA NREN community. The survey questions were 
constructed based on the core services for coordinating CSIRTs (Killcrece et al. 2003a, pp. 136–
137). The incident, vulnerability and artifact coordination services were generalized to 
“handling” and an intrusion detection service option was included as this could be attractive to 
this specific constituency based on the nature of the environment3.  The next section presents the 
results of the survey. 
 
 
6. Survey Results and Discussion 
The survey was distributed to the 25 institutions represented at the 2015 workshop to explore the 
establishment of a SA NREN CSIRT. Eighteen institutions (72%) completed the survey. 
Respondents were asked to rank the CSIRT services by value/importance: a score of 1 meaning 
most important and 11 meaning least important. The combined responses from the 18 
institutions resulted in the prioritization of services as per Table 4. As seen in the table, the top 
three services are: intrusion detection services, alerts and warnings, and incident 
handling/response. In the following section these results and their implications on services 
selection are discussed. 
 
The services ranking from the survey results provide useful inputs towards the SA NREN CSIRT 
services selection. To finalize the selection, some other factors need to be considered. This is 
because the customer’s perception may differ from that of the provider and these perceptions 
need to be harmonized. For example, to illustrate with the overlap of services, providing alerts 
and warnings require information to communicate on either from a technology watch service or 
incident report (from the handling or intrusion detection services). The literature is also re-visited 
to identify the primary sources for this type of CSIRT – identified as a coordinating CSIRT based 
on the environment (see Section 5). The next section therefore describes the selection of core 




                                                 
 
3 It would be more cost effective to provide a central IDS service than for each institution to 
deploy their own solution. The SA NREN CSIRT will also have insight and tools not accessible 
to the community that can be utilized for intrusion detection.   
 
 
Rank Service Combined 
score* 
1 Intrusion detection services 52 
2 Alerts and warnings 53 
3 Incident handling/response 66 
4 Vulnerability handling 72 
5 Incident coordination 82 
6 Announcements 83 
7 Technology watch 86 
8 Awareness building 89 
9 Information dissemination 107 
10 Education and training 109 
11 Artifact handling 119 
*combined by addition; lowest score = highest importance 
 
Table 4: Survey Results: Services by importance 
 
 
7. Selection of SA NREN CSIRT Services 
Killcrece et al. (2003a, pp. 135–137) provide a summary of services offered for each type of 
CSIRT identified in the handbook. This information is used to supplement the survey findings 
and facilitate the selection of services for the SA NREN CSIRT as shown in Table 5. The 
combined decision column shows the final decision as a combination of the survey rank together 
with the services identified for coordinating CSIRTs. The selected services for the SA NREN are 
shown in bold. 
 
To be called a CSIRT, the team must provide at least one of the incident handling services: 
incident analysis, response on site, support and/or coordination (West-Brown et al., 2003). For 
the SA NREN CSIRT, it makes sense that at least incident response support and coordination 
services are provided. Incident analysis could be offered in a limited fashion though is generally 
restricted to an advisory role for coordinating CSIRTs (Killcrece et al., 2003a). 
 
Vulnerability and artifact response coordination would form part of the incident coordination 
service (as they are interdependent). Artifact handling is unlikely though as this is a coordinating 
CSIRT.  
 





Alerts and warnings 2 Yes – core YES – high ranking + core 
Incident handling 3 + 5 (coord.) Yes – core YES – high ranking + core 











YES – high ranking; coordination only 
Artifact handling 11 Coordination 
only 
NO – low ranking 
Proactive 
services 
Announcements 6 Yes – core YES – med. ranking + core 
Technology watch 7 Yes – core YES – med. ranking + core 






NO – despite high interest it is unusual 

















NO –resource intensive + additional 
Intrusion detection 1 No – 
unusual 
YES – although unusual it’s the highest 
ranked for this constituency 
Information 
dissemination 
9 Yes – core YES – although low ranked it is 









NO – additional for coordinating 
CSIRTs; consider later 
Business continuity 





NO – additional for coordinating 
CSIRTs; consider later 




NO – additional for coordinating 
CSIRTs; consider later 
Awareness building 8 Yes – core YES – med. ranking + core 
Education and 
training 
10 Yes – core YES – can build on above + core 






NO – low interest + additional 
* lowest number = most important / highest rated. Interest was identified in a separate question. 
** adapted from Killcrece et al. (2003a, pp. 136–137) 
 
Table 5: CSIRT Services showing survey results and services for coordinating CSIRTs 
 
 
Alerts and warnings include notifications of incidents, critical vulnerabilities or related matters 
(e.g. fixes or mitigation advice) (Killcrece et al., 2003a). “The alert, warning or advisory is sent 
as a reaction to the current incident state – to notify constituents of the activity and to provide 
guidance for protecting or recovering affected systems.” (Cosmin Ciobanu et al., 2013, p. 4). For 
the SA NREN, examples from 2013-2015 include DDoS attacks, Heartbleed, Shellshock and the 
NTP vulnerability alerts. 
 
Announcements are similar to alerts but less urgent and aimed at proactive measures to reduce 
possible future incidents with medium- to long-term impact. They include general IT security 
news, best practices, patch release information, hot topics, latest tools, etc. This information 
equips the constituency to protect systems and networks against new vulnerabilities before they 
can be exploited (West-Brown et al., 2003). 
 
The intrusion detection service includes the deployment, monitoring and response to events 
reported by sensors on the network. For the SA NREN CSIRT this could include intrusion 
detection systems, honeypots, network telescopes and other sensors distributed on SANReN. 
Alerts and/or incident reports could be triggered by this service. To be effective, this service 
requires specialized tools or expertise (Killcrece et al., 2003a).  
 
Awareness building, including best practices and precautions (West-Brown et al., 2003), can take 
place in various forms. Direct training can form part of the incident response process for an 
individual or group from the constituency. It could also be extended to workshops, tutorials, 
courses, etc. Topics for awareness building include guidelines for reporting incidents, approaches 
and processes for responding to incidents as well as useful tools and technologies. The exact 
 
 
mechanisms and depth of service will be determined during implementation and could also 
evolve with time. This is seen as a fundamental service for the SA NREN CSIRT that could be 
supplemented by education and more in-depth training at a later date. 
 
The technology watch service ``involves reading security mailing lists, security web sites, and 
current news and journal articles in the fields of science, technology, politics, and government to 
extract information relevant to the security of the constituent systems and networks'' (West-
Brown et al., 2003, p. 30). Topics can include technical developments and emerging 
technologies, security-related trends, hacker activities and even legal, social or political issues 
(Killcrece et al., 2003a). This description reveals the dependence of other services on this 
service. 
 
Lastly, security-related information dissemination entails the development and publishing of 
security-related information (Killcrece et al., 2003a). “This service provides constituents with a 
comprehensive and easy-to-find collection of useful information that aids in improving security” 
(West-Brown et al., 2003, p. 32). This information can include outputs from the technology 
watch, incident handling and intrusion detection services in the form of alerts and warnings, 
announcements, a knowledge base (e.g. website/wiki), dashboards or even training materials 
(consult Killcrece et al. (2003a, p. 22) for additional examples).  
 
The SA NREN service offering, as discussed in this section, is repeated in Table 6 in summary 
form for clarity.  
 
Reactive services 
Alerts and warnings 
Incident handling  









Education and training 
 
Table 6: Service offering for the SA NREN CSIRT 
 
This offering is a subset of the services for coordinating CSIRTs with the addition of intrusion 
detection services based on the environment and survey results as described previously in this 
section.  
 
This information facilitates the compilation of a services portfolio for the SA NREN CSIRT. 
During the establishment phase, the other areas of CSIRT requirements (staffing, tools, policies, 
etc.) can be developed accordingly (Mooi & Botha, in press). Once the CSIRT is operational, 
these services would be offered as described. As the CSIRT matures and the needs of the 
constituency develop, additional services can be provided for inclusion in the services pipeline 






Following the identification of the need for an academic sector, coordinating CSIRT in South 
Africa, this paper described the process of selecting the initial services for the SA NREN CSIRT. 
Firstly, CSIRTs and the South African NREN environment were introduced. Thereafter the 
research problem (reducing the threat of malicious activity and coordinating incident response on 
the NREN) and objective (determining which CSIRT services should be provided) was 
described. The ITIL service portfolio management approach used to achieve this objective was 
presented next. This approach entails defining the services informed by authoritative CSIRT 
literature, the specific environment, as well as the perspective of the future constituency.  
 
Section 3 described how the literature study and survey method were used to collect the data for 
the paper. The next section introduced CSIRT services with a detailed description of the service 
categories and a list of all possible services. The SA NREN environment, as an important factor 
to consider when selecting services, was described next. In order to determine the constituency’s 
perspective on which services should be provided, a survey was utilized and filled in by 
attendees of an SA NREN CSIRT workshop. 
 
In Section 6 the survey results were presented followed by a brief discussion on how these 
results could be used to inform the selection of services complemented by literature advice and 
considering the environment. Lastly, the actual selection of the SA NREN CSIRT initial service 
offering is presented in Section 7. This result is a useful foundation for the development of the 
CSIRT services portfolio. The paper serves as an illustration of how CSIRT services can be 
selected and prioritized and is useful for anyone desiring to perform a similar exercise or 
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